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TWO SIDES OF THE COMBATANT COIN: UNTANGLING
DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES FROM
BELLIGERENT STATUS IN NON-INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICTS
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1.

INTRODUCTION

Determining who qualifies as a lawful object of attack in the
context of contemporary military operations against non-state
belligerents1 is an increasingly demanding challenge. While it is
axiomatic that only persons who qualify as either enemy
* Associate Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. Formerly Special
Assistant for Law of War Matters and Chief of the Law of War Branch, Office of
The Judge Advocate General, United States Army; Chief of International Law,
U.S. Army Europe; Professor of International and National Security Law, U.S.
Army Judge Advocate General’s School.
** Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps. Presently
serving as the Chief of the International Law Branch, Office of The Judge Advocate
General, Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this article are those of the
author and not The Judge Advocate General’s Corps, the U.S. Army, or the
Department of Defense.
1 The term ‘belligerent’ is used throughout this article to designate a member
of an armed group who performs the type of function historically performed by
lawful combatants who are members of the regular armed forces of a State. See
generally Richard R. Baxter, So-Called ‘Unprivileged Belligerency’: Spies, Guerillas, and
Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 323 (1951) (describing the legal treatment of those
who fall outside of the two traditional classes of persons entitled to protection
under international law during times of war). One of the challenges associated
with selecting a term to designate such individuals is that the Law of Armed
Conflict (LOAC) definition of ‘combatant’ is limited to the context of international
armed conflicts. See Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts art. 43, June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 [hereinafter Protocol I] (“Members of
the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and
chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to
say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities.”). As a result, various
terms have been offered for this designation, including unlawful combatant,
unprivileged belligerent, fighter, non-state actor, and non-state opponent. All of
these terms reflect a common underlying meaning: designation of an individual
who, as the result of his relationship with enemy belligerent leadership and
function as an enemy belligerent operative, should be treated for purposes of
attack authority no differently than a combatant within the meaning of Protocol I.
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belligerents or civilians taking a direct part in hostilities fall into
this category, the nature of the non-state operatives has blurred the
line between civilians protected from deliberate attack and
belligerent operatives subject to attack.2 Indeed, many scholars of
military strategy contend that this blurring is the result of
deliberate tactics employed by non-state operatives in an effort to
offset the military superiority of their nation state military
opponents by adding tremendous complexity to the target
decision-making process.3
The target identification and selection process is never easy;
uncertainty is an element of any armed conflict.
Threat
identification has always been a core task of U.S. armed forces, a
task intended to not only ensure the lawful use of combat power,
but to also maximize the tactical and operational effects of that use
while mitigating the risk to civilians.4 However, when engaged in
2 See GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 188 (2010) (“A combatant remains a combatant when
he/she is not actually fighting.”); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES
UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 33 (2nd ed. 2010)
(“Combatants fall into two categories: (i) Members of the armed forces of a
belligerent Party . . . . (ii) Any non-members of the armed forces who take an
active part in the hostilities . . . .”); see also Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, 11–
12 (2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-0020990.pdf (discussing the increasing prevalence of civilian participation in
hostilities and the confusion it creates).
3 See, e.g., Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Lawfare Today: A Perspective, 3 YALE J. INT’L
AFF. 146, 148 (2008) (highlighting the use of modern media by insurgents to
exploit civilian casualties in order to use the U.S. force’s adherence to law as a
weapon against them); see also Attack on the 507th Maintenance Company, 23 March
2003,
An
Nasiriyah,
Iraq,
Executive
Summary,
RICIOK.COM,
http://www.riciok.com/attack_summary.htm (last visted Nov. 19, 2011)
(outlining the attack on the 507th Maintenance Company by an enemy using
asymmetric tactics). See generally MICHAEL L. GROSS, MORAL DILEMMAS OF MODERN
WAR: TORTURE, ASSASSINATION, AND BLACKMAIL IN AN AGE OF ASYMMETRIC
CONFLICT (2010) (evaluating modern changes to combatant relationships and
identifying the moral issues inherent in asymmetric warfare); Eric Talbot Jensen,
Combatant Status: It is Time for Intermediate Levels of Recognition for Partial
Compliance, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 209 (2005) (reviewing the history of combatant status
and arguing for a modification of the law of combatants to allow for some
intermediate level of recognition in order to incentivize some type of selfidentification).
4 See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB 5-03.1: JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND
EXECUTION SYSTEM VOLUME I (PLANNING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES) ch. 2, para. 8
(1993), available at http://edocs.nps.edu/dodpubs/topic/jointpubs/JP5/JP503.1_930804.pdf (discussing the use of threat identification and assessment in the
larger context of the joint planning process); see also DEP’T. OF THE ARMY, FMI 3–
07.22, COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS, para. 2–50 (2004) (calling for the
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combat operations against non-state belligerents whose physical
characteristics are almost always indistinguishable from the
civilian population, the task of threat identification becomes
exponentially more complex. Furthermore, the consequence of
error is exacerbated by the risk of alienating the civilian
population, a consequence fundamentally inconsistent with the
core tenet of counterinsurgency strategy—protection of that
population.5
The difficulty in distinguishing the protected (civilians) from
the unprotected (belligerents and civilians taking a direct part in
hostilities) does not, however, warrant a fundamentally different
targeting paradigm in counterinsurgency operations, a noninternational armed conflict (NIAC), than in conventional
international armed conflicts (IAC).6 The integrity of the target
legality framework depends on the recognition of opposing
belligerent groups in any armed conflict.
This recognition
facilitates implementation of the principle of distinction by
allowing belligerent forces to segregate those they encounter into
two distinct groups: those presumed hostile and therefore subject
to immediate attack, and all others (civilians) presumed nonhostile and therefore protected from immediate attack.7 As will be
discussed in this Article, neither of these presumptions is absolute;
both may be rebutted based on the nature of the interaction with
coordination of ARSOF operations in order to avoid potential unwanted
casualties).
5 See COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS, supra note 4, para. 2–10 (stating that
protection of the civilian population is essential to a successful counterinsurgency
operation).
6 Compare Melzer, supra note 2, at 76
In practice, civilian direct participation in hostilities is likely to entail
significant confusion and uncertainty in the implementation of the
principle of distinction. In order to avoid the erroneous or arbitrary
targeting of civilians entitled to protection against direct attack, it is
therefore of particular importance that all feasible precautions be taken
in determining whether a person is a civilian and, if so, whether he or
she is directly participating in hostilities. In case of doubt, the person in
question must be presumed to be protected against direct attack.,
with Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 51(2), (3) (“The civilian population as such, as
well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack . . . . unless and for
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”).
7 Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 48 (“In order to ensure respect for and
protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict
shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants . . .
.”).
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friendly forces. However, these presumptions add a modicum of
clarity to an increasingly uncertain operational environment,
clarity derived from the very nature of armed conflict and essential
to protect both civilians and belligerents from the effects of
overzealous or unjustifiably hesitant targeting authority.
This may all seem obvious, but in reality there is an increasing
tendency to treat all non-state actors as merely a conglomeration of
civilians who take a direct part in hostilities. This trend gained
momentum following publication by the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) of the Interpretative Guidance on the
Meaning of Direct Participation in Hostilities (DPH Study)—
although, ironically, the DPH Study rejects this position.8 Indeed,
the derivative effect of considering all such non-state actors as
civilians is that no one is genuinely protected by the distinction
obligation.
The trend appears to be the result of the combined effect of the
lack of an explicit definition of a combatant that is applicable to
NIAC, and the DPH Study’s endorsement of the concept of
“continuous combat function” (CCF) as a means of establishing
direct participation in hostilities (which results in a loss of civilian
protection from attack).9 The effect of the CCF concept has made it
more convenient to analyze the legality of attacking non-state
actors through the DPH methodology than to assess whether such
actors fall into a category of presumptively targetable belligerents
subject to attack, no differently than their IAC counterparts.
This Article will challenge that approach to targeting
categorization in NIAC as flawed. In so doing, it will argue that it
is critical to acknowledge that NIAC—any NIAC—involves
hostilities between opposing armed belligerent groups whose
members are presumptive military objectives. To support this
argument, the Article begins by discussing the law of armed
conflict’s (LOAC’s) categorization of civilians and belligerents
(combatants in IAC), and how a lack of an explicit treaty definition
of combatant in the NIAC context is an obstacle to acknowledging
analogous categorization in NIAC.
8 See generally Melzer, supra note 2 (analyzing the problems presented by the
increasing number of participants in hostilities that do not adequately distinguish
themselves from civilians, and the need for a finer level of distinction between
civilian and combatant).
9 See id. at 27–36 (discussing the distinction of civilians, armed forces, and
organized armed groups under the LOAC, and the application of the CCF
concept).
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The Article then explores organizational membership and how
subordination to command and control is the fundamental
difference between belligerents and civilians in any armed conflict.
It will explain the difference between status and conduct based
targeting and why a focus on conduct to assess belligerent status is
merely a permutation of traditional status recognition analysis.
The Article then contrasts that approach by examining why the
use of conduct undermines the extension of the DPH rule to define
enemy belligerent forces. These problems result in the DPH
Study’s problematic and arguably schizophrenic imposition of a
minimum force requirement even when targeting those engaged in
CCF. As the Article details, the utility of CCF is not in assessing
which civilians are taking a direct part in hostilities, but in
determining when an individual appearing to be a civilian is in fact
a belligerent operative of an armed organized group.
The Article will then address why treating all non-state
opposition personnel as civilians taking a direct part in hostilities—
even when applying the CCH concept—provides these operatives
with an unjustifiable windfall and conflates law and rules of
engagement. The Article concludes with a proposal of how to
reconcile the DPH Study with status based targeting presumptions:
maintain the distinction integrity. Acknowledging that NIAC
involves armed hostilities between competing belligerent groups is
a critical first step, and the DPH Study makes an important
contribution to this acknowledgment. However, this must be
accompanied by an additional acknowledgment: all belligerent
operatives—those involved in IAC and NIAC—are subject to
status based targeting authority
2.

BACKGROUND

2.1. LOAC Categorization of Civilians and Combatants
Combatant. For a layman, the meaning of this term probably
seems obvious. However, in the LOAC lexicon, nothing could be
further from the truth. While it might be tempting to invoke the
ubiquitous ‘you know it when you see it’ U.S. Supreme Court
definition of pornography for the term combatant, operational
reality and legal definition appear severely attenuated where this
term is concerned.10 The mere fact that a definition for combatant

10

Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011

01 CORN JENKS.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

318

11/30/2011 10:57 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 33:2

remained purely customary until finally defined in The 1977
Protocol Additional I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (AP I)
indicates the extent of legal uncertainty and complexity associated
with the this term.11
Ironically, it was not widespread discomfort with the
uncertainty of the term combatant that motivated adoption of an
express definition in AP I.12 Instead, it was the need to define
“civilian”—a definition central to the protection established for
civilians at the core of AP I’s targeting regime—that provided the
motivation. Because AP I adopted a negative definition of civilian
(all individuals who are not combatants), it was necessary to
provide an explicit definition of combatant.13 Although it took
until 1977 for the development of a positive treaty definition of
combatant, there existed, prior to this date, a general customary
understanding of the term. This customary understanding was
based on two intertwined concepts: privileged belligerent and
prisoner of war.14
In 1899, The Hague Convention II and Annexed Regulations—
the first comprehensive multi-lateral treaty regulating land
warfare—defined individuals lawfully authorized to participate in
hostilities.15 According to Article 1 of the Regulations:
I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I
understand to be embraced within that shorthand description [of hardcore pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly
doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in
this case is not that.
Id.
11 See Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 43(2) (defining combatants as members of
the armed forces of any party to a conflict).
12 See id. art. 50 (declaring a civilian to be any person other than those defined
in Article 43 of the Protocol and Article 4(A) of the Convention).
13 COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 610–12 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987)
[hereinafter COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS] (discussing, over
several paragraphs, the defining characteristics of a “combatant”).
14 See SOLIS, supra note 2, at 41–42 (discussing the history of the combatant’s
privilege); see also Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (defining the term “prisoner of war” and
outlining categories into which prisoners of war fall, under this provision).
15 See The Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Law and Customs of
War on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of
War on Land art. 1, July 29, 1899, 31 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247, available at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/150?OpenDocument [hereinafter Hague (II)
Regulations for War on Land] (providing for the issuing of instructions to armed
land forces).
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The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to
armies, but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the
following
conditions:
1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a
distance;
3.
To
carry
arms
openly;
and
4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws
and
customs
of
war.
In countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the
army, or form part of it, they are included under the
denomination “army.”16
It is clear from this provision that regular armed forces, or
“armies,” were considered ipso facto lawfully authorized to engage
in hostilities. An identical version of this definition was included
in the 1907 revision of the Regulations.17 This provision reflected
the general understanding of the time that individuals authorized
by their State to participate in armed hostilities – most obviously
members of the regular armed forces but also militia and volunteer
personnel properly connected to the command and control
structure of the regular armed forces – were lawful belligerents.18
Because the treaty recognized the lawful authority of these state
forces to participate in hostilities, all individuals falling within this
Hague definition were considered lawful belligerents: belligerents
because the duties of war required them to engage in hostilities;
lawful because the treaty recognized their legal right to do so.
The four part test for determining when associated militias
qualified as lawful belligerents subsequently influenced the

16 Id. § 1, ch. 1, art. 1 (outlining the rights and duties of armies, militia, and
volunteer corps).
17 The Hague Convention (IV) with Respect to the Law and Customs of War
on Land, Annex to the Convention: Regulations Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land art. 1, October 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631
[hereinafter Hague (IV) Regulations for War on Land] (adopting the same
definition found in Hague (II) Regulations for War on Land, for “[t]he
qualifications of Belligerents”).
18 See id. (explaining that belligerents included armies, militia, and volunteer
corps who were, among other requirements, “commanded by a person
responsible for his subordinates”).
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development of a treaty definition of prisoner of war (POW).19
Although neither the 1899 nor 1907 Hague Regulations included an
express POW definition, both these treaties implied that any
individual satisfying the definition of belligerent who falls into
enemy hands would be a POW.20 The linkage between the lawful
belligerent definition and POW status became express in 1929,
when the first treaty devoted to the protection of POWs came into
force. Article 1 of the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War included within the protection of
the treaty all captured individuals who met the Hague Regulation
definition of lawfully qualified belligerent.21 When updated in
1949, the drafters incorporated the Hague lawful belligerent
definition verbatim as the POW definition. According to Article 4
of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War (GPW):
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention,
are persons belonging to one of the following categories,
who have fallen into the power of the enemy:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as
well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part
of
such
armed
forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other
volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance
movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and
operating in or outside their own territory, even if this
territory is occupied, provided that such militias or
volunteer corps, including such organized resistance
movements,
fulfil
the
following
conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for

19 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
supra note 14, art. 4(A) (defining prisoners of war through the use of definitions
almost identical to that used in Hague (II) Regulations for War on Land).
20 See Hague (II) Regulations for War on Land, supra note 15, § 1, ch. 2
(detailing the prescribed treatment of prisoners of war, in the chapter directly
following the definition of “belligerents”); Hague (IV) Regulations for War on
Land, supra note 17, § 1, ch. 2 (same).
21 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art.
1, 27 July 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, 118 L.N.T.S. 343.
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subordinates;

(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance;
(c)

that

of

carrying

arms

openly;

(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with
the laws and customs of war.22
This undisputed interrelationship between the Hague
definition of lawful belligerent and the GPW definition of POW led
to reliance on Article 4 of the GPW as the controlling definition of
lawful belligerent, or combatant. Nonetheless, it was clear that
nothing in Article 4 of the GPW purported to define the term
combatant.23 Instead, Article 4 simply relied on the antecedent
Hague definition of lawful belligerent as the core for its POW
definition. However, in the absence of an express definition of
combatant, it became common practice to equate the GPW
definition of POW with that of combatant —a practice difficult to
question considering the origins of the POW definition.24 What
remained uncertain, however, was whether the implied combatant
definition of Article 4 of the GPW (and by implication, Article 1 of
the Hague Regulations) was exclusive, or whether it only defined
combatants legally authorized to engage in hostilities. In other
words, what is the proper characterization of a “fighter” without
legal privilege? Can this fighter be considered a de facto combatant
without privilege? Or by exclusion, is this individual a civilian
engaging in conduct inconsistent with his presumptive inoffensive
status?25

Id. art. 4.
See id.
24 See THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS (III) OF 12 AUGUST 1949: COMMENTARY 45–48
(Jean Pictet ed. 1952) (describing how the 1899 and 1907 Conferences’ lengthiest
and most important discussions focused on the definition of “belligerent status”);
see generally Geoffrey S. Corn, Unarmed but How Dangerous? Civilian Augmentees,
the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Search for a More Effective Test for Permissible
Civilian Battlefield Functions, 2 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 257 (2008) (detailing the
history of and qualifying characteristics that compose prisoner of war status, as
outlined in part by the Geneva Conventions).
25 See COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 558
(citation omitted).
22
23
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The lack of an express combatant definition in the various
treaties developed to regulate armed conflict, made it impossible to
answer this question with certitude. Additional clarity emerged in
1977. In that year, AP I provided the first express treaty definition
of combatant.26 As indicated by the ICRC Commentary to the
In armed conflict with an international character, a person of enemy
nationality who is not entitled to prisoner-of-war status is, in principle, a
civilian protected by the fourth Convention, so that there are no gaps in
protection. However, things are not always so straightforward in the
context of the armed conflicts of Article 1 (General principles and scope
of application), paragraph 4, as the adversaries can have the same
nationality. (52) Moreover, the concept of alien occupation often becomes
rather fluid in guerrilla operations as no fixed legal border delineates the
areas held by either Party, and this may result in insurmountable
technical difficulties with regard to the application of some of the
provisions of the Fourth Convention.
Id.
26 Additional Protocols I and II of 1977 were developed to supplement and
bring up to date the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Although the United
States played a significant role in the drafting of these treaties, Additional
Protocol I was withdrawn from Senate consideration by President Reagan. See
Letter of Transmittal from President Ronald Reagan, Protocol II Additional to the
1949 Geneva Conventions, and Relating to the Protections of Victims of Non
International Armed Conflicts, S. Treaty Doc. No. 2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., at III
(1987) (stating the U.S. government’s reasoning as to why Protocol I would not be
submitted for senatorial advice and consent). This was in large measure because
of the conclusion that several provisions of Additional Protocol I extended LOAC
protections to terrorists; and that the scope provision of Additional Protocol II
was too restrictive. Id.
Nonetheless, prior to U.S. military response to the attacks of September 11,
2001, characterizing the bulk of Additional Protocol I as a reflection of customary
international law binding on the United States would have been relatively
uncontroversial among legal experts responsible for advising U.S. military
planners and commanders. The post-September 11, 2001 legal determinations
made by President Bush regarding the applicability of law of war provisions to
the conflict with al Qaeda, however, radically altered this practice. A much more
textual approach prevailed when interpreting law of war treaty obligations. See
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel,
Dep’t of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J.
Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t. of Def., regarding Application of Treaties
and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (22 Jan. 2002), available at
http://washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/012202bybee.pdf
(responding to the issue of whether certain treaties included in the laws of armed
conflict apply to trial procedures and detention conditions for members of al
Qaida and the Taliban).
This revised approach to interpreting the status of provisions of Additional
Protocol I is reflected by comparing treatment of this treaty in the law of war
chapter of the Operational Law Handbook, which is perhaps the most widely-relied
upon reference for military legal practitioners supporting ongoing operations.
The current version of the Handbook provides the following:
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treaty, the GPW left the definition of this critical term to inference:
“[i]n the Third Convention, which deals only with the protection of
prisoners of war, and not with the conduct of hostilities, this
combatant status is not explicitly affirmed, but it is implicitly
included in the recognition of prisoner-of-war status in the event of
capture.”27

1977 Geneva Protocols (ref. (7)). Although the U.S. has not ratified
[Additional Protocol] I and II, 155 nations have ratified [Additional
Protocol] I. U.S. Commanders must be aware that many allied forces are
under a legal obligation to comply with the Protocols . . . . This
difference in obligation has not proved to be a hindrance to U.S./allied
or coalition operations since promulgation of AP I in 1977.
INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER &
SCHOOL, JA 422, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 15 (2006).
Although this excerpt does not explicitly indicate a rejection of prior
interpretations of obligation vis-à-vis Additional Protocol I, it clearly does not
explicitly assert such an obligation. The full significance of this excerpt is only
apparent when compared to the description of Additional Protocol I in prior
editions of the Operational Law Handbook. For example, the 2003 edition states the
following:
1977 Geneva Protocols (ref. (7)). Although the U.S. has not ratified
[Geneva Protocol] I and II, judge advocates must be aware that
approximately 150 nations have ratified the Protocols (thus most of the
185 member states of the [United Nations]). The Protocols will come into
play in most international operations. U.S. Commanders must be aware
that many allied forces are under a legal obligation to comply with the
Protocols. Furthermore, the U.S. considers many of the provisions of the
Protocols to be applicable as customary international law.
INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER &
SCHOOL, JA 422, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 11 (2003) (emphasis added).
Comparison of these two versions of the Operational Law Handbook indicates a
general “rollback” by the executive branch of the treatment of Additional Protocol
I provisions. Numerous experts and government legal advisers have argued for
years that many of these provisions reflect binding norms of customary
international law. See, e.g., Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position on the
Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949
Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT’L & POL’Y 419 (1987) (demonstrating that the
1977 Protocols have a solid basis in customary international law); see also, e.g.,
Memorandum from W. Hays Parks, LCDR Michael F. Lohr, Dennis Yoder, and
William Anderson, to John H. McNeill, Assistant Gen. Counsel (Int'l), Office of the
Sec'y of Def., 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions: Customary
International Law Implications (8 May 1986). Unfortunately, opponents of this
proposition have relied on the repudiation of Additional Protocol I by President
Reagan. These opponents assert this repudiation is particularly relevant vis-à-vis
the armed conflict with al Qaeda because it was motivated in large part by the
United States’ concern that Additional Protocol I unjustifiably extended law of
war protections to terrorist operatives.
27 COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 515.
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In order to provide a more certain definition of combatant,
Article 43(2) of AP I provides that “[m]embers of the armed forces
of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains
covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants,
that is to say, they have the right to participate directly in
hostilities.”28 Simple and direct, this definition reveals its roots in
both the Hague Regulations and the GPW. Combatants include all
members of the armed forces with the exception of medical
personnel and chaplains—individuals technically considered noncombatant members of the armed forces because of their limited
function of caring for and ministering to the wounded and sick. As
combatants these individuals are legally authorized to participate
in hostilities. Who falls into the category of armed forces? Article
43(1) answers this question by defining armed forces:
The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all
organized armed forces, groups and units which are under
a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its
subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a
government or an authority not recognized by an adverse
Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal
disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce
compliance with the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict.29
Accordingly, armed forces include the organized armed units
of a party to an armed conflict, and all such individuals are
combatants vested with the legal authority to engage in armed
hostilities. Perhaps of equal importance is that this definition was
considered exclusive, meaning that only members of the armed
forces (as defined by Article 43(1)) qualify as combatants within the
meaning of international law. This conclusion is emphasized by
the Commentary discussion of Article 43:
All members of the armed forces are combatants, and only
members of the armed forces are combatants. This should
therefore dispense with the concept of “quasi-combatants”,
which has sometimes been used on the basis of activities
related more or less directly with the war effort. Similarly,
any concept of a part-time status, a semi-civilian, semi28
29

Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 43(2).
Id. art. 43(1).
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military status, a soldier by night and peaceful citizen by
day, also disappears. A civilian who is incorporated in an
armed organization such as that mentioned in paragraph 1,
becomes a member of the military and a combatant
throughout the duration of the hostilities . . . .30
As noted above, the explicit definition of combatant and civilian as
the exclusive legal categorization of individuals in armed conflict
was directly linked to AP I’s codification of the principle of
distinction; requiring combatants to constantly distinguish
between those individuals qualifying as lawful objects of deliberate
attack, and civilians protected from being made the deliberate
The
object of attack, necessitated this express definition.31
definition of combatant therefore established two competing
targeting presumptions: combatants are presumed to be lawful
objects of attack, whereas all other individuals (civilians by
exclusion) are protected by a rebuttable presumption of
inoffensiveness with an accordant immunity from deliberate
attack.
A combatant—an individual who according to AP I is granted
the legal privilege to participate in hostilities—must therefore be a
member of the armed forces or a member of a paramilitary
organization associated with the armed forces operating under
traditional command and subject to the military unit’s disciplinary
structure.32 It is clear that civilians (even when authorized by a
state to be present in the conflict area and therefore entitled to
POW status upon capture) are not combatants pursuant to AP I
because they are not fully integrated into a military command,
control, and disciplinary structure.33 While Article 43 therefore
added clarity to the categorization of individuals associated with
armed conflict, two aspects of the definition call into question the
extent of its impact on the broader question of targeting status
30 COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 515
(emphasis added).
31 See id. at 514, 599–600 (providing distinct definitions for civilian and
combatant, but noting that such sharp classifications cannot be performed easily).
32 See Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 43(2) (“Members of the armed forces of a
Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel and chaplains covered by Article
33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to
participate directly in hostilities.”).
33 E.g., COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 515
(“All members of the armed forces are combatants, and only members of the
armed forces are combatants.”) (emphasis added).
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outside the context of inter-state hostilities. First and most
obviously, because the definition is embedded in AP I, it is limited
to situations of international (inter-state34) armed conflicts.
Additional Protocol II (AP II), AP I’s sister treaty supplementing
the law applicable to NIAC, included no analogous definition.35
Second, the definition of combatant included only individuals
fighting on behalf of a state authority. Article 43 simply did not
address individuals fighting on behalf of non-state entities.36
The inapplicability of Article 43’s combatant definition to
NIAC has contributed to what the authors assert is a false
conclusion that “combatant” is an alien concept outside the context
of IAC. Instead of focusing on the lack of an analogous definition
in AP II, the more appropriate focus in assessing targeting status in
NIAC is the relationship between the principle of distinction and

34 “Additional Protocol I contains significant advances in LOAC. The core
LOAC concepts of distinction, unnecessary suffering, and proportionality,
formerly found only in customary law, are codified and described in Additional
Protocol I, if only in broad terms.” SOLIS, supra note 2, at 122. However, some of
the provisions of AP I pushed the boundaries of LOAC too far and rendered it
objectionable to the United States (as well as many other nations) leading the
United States not to ratify it. For example, Article 1(3) makes the treaty applicable
to international armed conflicts. Protocol I, supra note 1, art 1(3). Then, Article
1(4) “goes onto expand the definition of what constitutes an international armed
conflict” making the treaty applicable to CARs – conflicts purporting to resist
colonial domination, alien occupation or a racist regime. SOLIS, supra note 2, at
123. The United States was unable to accept this definition arguing that it “blurs
national and international conflicts, making the applicability of [LOAC], turn on
the asserted motive of a rebel force.” Id. at 124. The United States has not ratified
AP I; the AP I version on an international armed conflict is not accepted as
customary international law. See Protocol I, supra note 1, art 1(3)–(4) (noting that
the protections of international customary law are available to persons whose
cases are not covered by the Protocol).
35 See generally Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol II), Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 610 [hereinafter Protocol II]
(containing no definition of the term “combatant”).
36 See Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 43(1).

The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed
forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that
Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented
by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party.
Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system
which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international
law applicable in armed conflict.
Id.
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the division between civilians and de facto combatants.37 As noted
above, Article 43 was included in AP I as the essential predicate to
implementing this principle. Accordingly, the underlying premise
of Article 43 is that in order to facilitate the distinction process, it is
essential to establish a clear dichotomy between combatant
(privileged or unprivileged) and civilian. Without this dichotomy,
the efficacy of this critical principle will inevitably be diluted. In
essence, if everyone is a civilian, then no one is genuinely protected
by the distinction obligation, for government forces will inevitably
blur the line between “enemy” and “civilian.”
The fact that Article 43’s definition of combatant is tethered to
the Hague definition of “qualified belligerent” likely explains why
a similar article was not included in AP II. By linking the
definition of combatant with legal qualification to participate in
hostilities, the definition became incompatible with the law of
NIAC, where by definition only the government forces may
lawfully use force. From the inception of Common Article 3, the
first LOAC provision developed specifically to regulate NIAC,
states adamantly opposed even the suggestion that non-state
belligerents were vested with legal privilege to engage in hostilities
against state forces.38 Although the ICRC pressed for such a
37 Although AP II does not contain an analogous definition of combatant as
that in AP I, it does require that civilians be “[protected] against the dangers
arising from military operations.” See Protocol II, supra note 35, art. 13.
38 See 1 COMMENTARY, GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE
CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 43–44 (Jean
Pictet ed., 1952) [hereinafter WOUNDED AND SICK COMMENTARY]:
From the very outset, in the course of the first discussions of a general
character, divergences of view became apparent. A considerable number
of delegations were opposed, if not to any and every provision in regard
to civil war, at any rate to the unqualified application of the Convention
to such conflicts. The principal criticisms of the Stockholm draft may be
summed up as follows. It was said that it would cover in advance all
forms of insurrection, rebellion, anarchy, and the break-up of States, and
even plain brigandage. Attempts to protect individuals might well prove
to be at the expense of the equally legitimate protection of the State. To
compel the Government of a State in the throes of internal convulsions to
apply to these internal disturbances the whole body of provisions of a
Convention expressly concluded to cover the case of war would mean
giving its enemies, who might be no more than a handful of rebels or
common brigands, the status of belligerents, and possibly even a certain
degree of legal recognition. There was also a risk of common or ordinary
criminals being encouraged to give themselves a semblance of
organization as a pretext for claiming the benefit of the Conventions,
representing their crimes as ‘acts of war’ in order to escape punishment
for them. A party of rebels, however small, would be entitled under the
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development, because it would prohibit states from punishing
their own citizens for taking up arms against lawful authority, the
proposal was dead on arrival.39 State opposition to granting
dissident and insurgent belligerent forces legal privilege to engage
in hostilities has been a constant feature of the LOAC even during
an era of amalgamation of IAC and NIAC.
Indeed, the
inapplicability of legal privilege for non-state operatives in NIAC
is today the most significant genuine difference between the law of
IAC and NIAC.40 Accordingly, applying Article 43’s definition of
combatant to NIAC was and remains incompatible with this
fundamental difference in the nature of these two categories of
armed conflict.
Nonetheless, what is most significant about AP I’s definition of
combatant is the segregation of individuals into two distinct
categories for purposes of facilitating implementation of the
principle of distinction. This segregation effectively sets the
conditions for belligerents (members of opposing armed organized
groups) to distinguish between lawful objects of attack and
individuals protected from attack.41 In the context of IAC, two
considerations made it totally logical to link the definition of
Conventions to ask for the assistance and intervention of a Protecting
Power.
39 See, e.g., id. (explaining how the differences in opinion led to criticism of
the Stockholm draft).
40 See Grand Jury Indictment at 11–12, United States v. Walker Lindh (E.
Dist.
Va.
Feb.
5,
2002)
(No.
02-37a)
available
at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/lindh/uswlindh020502cmp.html
(indicting a non-state actor for conspiracy to kill Americans based on his
involvement with al-Qaeda); Memorandum from President George Bush to the
Vice President et al. on the Humane Treatment of Taliban and al Qaeda (Feb. 7,
2002), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127
/02.02.07.pdf (expressing his view that the Geneva Convention does not apply to
the United States’ conflict with al-Qaeda because al-Qaeda is not a state actor);
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, JPS 383, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT ¶ 15.6.2, at 389 (2004) (U.K.) (“Unlike combatants in an international
armed conflict, members of dissident armed forces remain liable to prosecution
for offences under domestic law.”); Chris Jenks & Eric Talbot Jensen, Indefinite
Detention Under the Laws of War, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 41, 54 (2011)
(“[I]ncreasingly prevalent in today's conflicts involving non-state actors and
asymmetric warfare, are law of war provisions which govern detention of those
who directly participate in hostilities, perform a continuous combat function for
an organized armed group, or otherwise pose a security risk or threat.”).
41 See Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 43 (limiting the types of participants who
have a “right to participate directly in hostilities”).
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combatant to the regular armed forces and militias properly
integrated with those forces. First, armed forces had customarily
been considered combatants. Second, IAC by its very nature
almost always involves hostilities between two or more nationstate militaries.42 Neither of these considerations extend to NIAC,
especially the classic internal armed conflict.43 Internal conflicts
had customarily involved hostilities between government armed
forces and dissident armed forces or other organized belligerent
groups (or even between competing organized non-state
belligerent groups). Designating all of these belligerents as
combatants ran afoul of the assumption that state armed forces
acted pursuant to lawful authority, whereas dissident forces acted
without such authority.44 Furthermore, NIAC by its nature did not
involve hostilities between the regular armed forces of two states,
but between regular state armed forces and non-state belligerent
groups.45
Nonetheless, the recognition of opposition belligerent groups is
an essential aspect of all conflict regulation. Nothing about the
nature of NIAC undermines the importance of this recognition in
relation to implementing the principle of distinction. Indeed, while
there is no analogous combatant definition in AP II, that treaty

42 However, hostilities are not always necessary; the law applicable to IAC
also applies to uncontested occupations. An occupation is simply “taking firm
possession of enemy territory for the purpose of holding it.” See DEP’T OF THE
ARMY, FM27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, ¶ 351–52(a) (1956), available at
http://www.aschq.army.mil/gc/files/fm27-10.pdf
(defining
the
term
“occupation” and outlining the effectiveness, maintenance, and termination of an
occupation). Occupations, whether contested or not, are governed by the Geneva
Convention for the protection of civilians. E.g., Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, 3518 (“The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total
occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said
occupation meets with no armed resistance.”).
43 But see Geoffrey S. Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities:
The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
295, 309 (2007) (arguing that the either/or approach to determining whether a
conflict is international or non-international fails to consider the possibility of a
hybrid category of armed conflict: extraterritorial non-international armed
conflict).
44 See WOUNDED AND SICK COMMENTARY, supra note 38, at 43–44 (“Insurgents .
. . are not all brigands.”).
45 E.g., id. (stating that the reason states did not want to extend the scope of
Common Article 2 was so as not to extend legitimacy to internal dissident
groups).
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does impose an explicit distinction obligation to “parties” to a
NIAC. According to Article 13:
1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall
enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from
military operations. To give effect to this protection, the
following rules shall be observed in all circumstances.
2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual
civilians, shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of
violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror
among the civilian population are prohibited.46
This prohibition against making civilians the object of attack in
the context of NIAC necessarily implies that there must be other
individuals falling outside this protection who are subject to a
presumption of targetability.
How are such individuals
characterized? If they fall within a presumptive lawful attack
authority, they cannot properly be considered civilians, because
civilians benefit from the inverse presumption protecting them
from deliberate attack. Are they combatants? The absence of a
combatant definition in AP II might suggest a negative answer to
this question. Certainly, it is difficult to sustain an argument that
they are combatants within the meaning of the AP I combatant
definition—an individual legally privileged to participate in
hostilities. However, the obvious division between lawful and
unlawful objects of attack reflected in Article 13 indicates that
organized non-state belligerent operatives are, in effect,
combatants without privilege, individuals subject to presumptive
lawful attack authority by virtue of their status, yet lacking any
international legal authority to participate in hostilities against the
state.47
The Commentary to Article 13 corroborates the conclusion that
Article 13 does indeed reflect the assumption that civilians are
distinct from the organized armed groups engaged in NIAC.48
Protocol II, supra note 35, art. 13(1)–(2).
See id. art. 13(3) (“Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Part,
unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”).
48 See COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 1447–53
(analyzing the implicit meaning of Article 13 and providing definitions of
civilians, how military groups should interact with known civilian populations,
and defining the term “attack” for its use in the Article’s prohibition against
attacking civilians).
46
47
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These groups are normally not characterized as combatants (for the
reasons explained above), but instead as “parties to the conflict.”
For example, in emphasizing the obligation that belligerent parties
in NIAC take measures to ensure compliance with Article 13, the
Commentary notes:
Each party should, in good faith, design such measures and
adapt them to the specific circumstances, bearing in mind
the means available to it, and based on the general
principles relating to the protection of the civilian
population which apply irrespective of whether the conflict is an
international or an internal one.49
The Commentary also acknowledges that distinguishing between
true civilians and members of armed non-state groups may often
be difficult in the NIAC context, but that this does not alter the
fundamental protection of the civilian. Interestingly, the term
combatant slips into the Commentary discussion:
It cannot be denied that in situations of non-international
armed conflict in particular, the civilian population
sometimes shelters certain combatants, and it may be
difficult to ascertain the status of individuals making up the
population. However, we must point out that if the mere
presence of some individuals not protected under
paragraph 3 of this article were to permit an attack against
a whole group of civilians, the protection enjoyed by the
civilian population would become totally illusory.50
These references to the commentary all point to the same
conclusion: although the treaty law of NIAC does not include an
express combatant definition, NIAC involves hostilities between
state armed forces and non-state de facto combatants.
The alternative inference derived from the absence of a
definition of combatant in treaties regulating NIAC is that the
concept is exclusive to IAC.
Accordingly, NIAC involves
hostilities between state armed forces and civilians directly
participating in hostilities. This interpretation is fatally flawed. As
will be explained in greater detail below, it distorts the
fundamental lines of authority and obligation historically
associated with armed conflict. By treating members of armed
49
50

Id. at 1449 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1452 (emphasis added).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011

01 CORN JENKS.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

332

11/30/2011 10:57 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 33:2

belligerent groups as civilians directly participating in hostilities—
even when applying an expansive definition of direct participation
endorsed by the DPH Study—the authority of government forces
to engage and subdue these individuals is diluted. Furthermore,
refusal to segregate the population into de facto combatant and
civilian populations compromises the principle of distinction.
These inevitable consequences of failing to acknowledge nonstate belligerents in the context of NIAC motivated the ICRC to
conclude that the legal authority to attack members of non-state
belligerent groups in NIAC is identical to the authority to engage
combatants in IAC.51 While not using the term combatant to
characterize members of such groups, it is clear that the ICRC
understands that the authority to target non-state belligerent
operatives is not based exclusively on a DPH test. Instead, the
DPH rule operates as a limitation on the protection afforded to
civilians in NIAC no differently than it does in IAC. However, this
rule is inapposite to members of armed belligerent groups, for such
individuals are not properly considered true civilians, but instead
‘belligerents’ subject to lawful attack by virtue of their connection
and role within the group. Accordingly, unlike civilians who take
a direct part in hostilities, the legality of attacking such individuals
is derived from their membership status and not their individual
conduct assessed on a case-by-case basis. This conclusion is
reflected in the DPH Study. According to Part II:
While it is generally recognized that members of State
armed forces in non-international armed conflict do not
qualify as civilians, treaty law, State practice, and
international jurisprudence have not unequivocally settled
whether the same applies to members of organized armed
groups (i.e. the armed forces of non-State parties to an
armed conflict).
Because organized armed groups
generally cannot qualify as regular armed forces under
national law, it might be tempting to conclude that
membership in such groups is simply a continuous form of
civilian direct participation in hostilities. Accordingly,
members of organized armed groups would be regarded as
civilians who, owing to their continuous direct

51 See Melzer, supra note 2, at 36 (concluding that civilians cease to be
identified as such when they engage in continuous combat as members of
organized armed groups).
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participation in hostilities, lose protection against direct
attack for the entire duration of their membership.
However, this approach would seriously undermine the
conceptual integrity of the categories of persons underlying the
principle of distinction, most notably because it would create
parties to non-international armed conflicts whose entire armed
forces remain part of the civilian population. As the wording
and logic of Article 3 GC I-IV and Additional Protocol II
(AP II) reveals, civilians, armed forces, and organized
armed groups of the parties to the conflict are mutually
exclusive categories also in non-international armed
conflict.52
If the ICRC is correct (consistent with the thesis of this Article),
what then distinguishes civilians from non-state belligerent
operatives53 in the context of NIAC? As noted above, the answer
cannot be found in any positive treaty provision applicable to
NIAC. Instead, the answer is revealed by considering the
fundamental difference between belligerents and civilians in any
armed conflict: subordination to belligerent command and control.
2.2. Role of Organizational Membership and Subordination to
Command and Control
Armed conflict involves the contest between belligerent
opponents organized into military units acting to achieve tactical,
operational, and strategic objectives. The very purpose of the
organized nature of belligerent groups is to ensure that individuals
act to achieve these collective military goals. The inherent
obligation of members of such groups to obey the orders of
military and civilian superiors is consistent with this purpose.
Command structure, rank, and the duty of obedience all reflect a
simple axiom of belligerent groups: members of these groups act

Id. at 27–28 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
The Authors use the term “belligerent” in lieu of “combatant” for the
purpose of distinguishing non-state belligerent operatives (who lack any legal
privilege to participate in hostilities) with state belligerent operatives who are
designated “combatants” in accordance with Article 43 of AP I. However, this is
not intended to suggest any fundamental difference in the authority to subject
individuals of either designation to deliberate attack.
52
53
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as agents of the group leadership to achieve military goals, not as
individuals.54
From the inception of treaty-based recognition of belligerents
in the 1899 Hague Regulations, emphasis on this subordination to
command authority has defined the concept of belligerent.55 As
noted above, this was originally reflected in the requirement that
individuals operate on behalf of the state—the only entity
authorized within the Westphalian system to authorize lawful
belligerent conduct.56 However, it is also clear that this was not in
and of itself sufficient to qualify as a belligerent. In addition,
belligerents were those individuals integrated into the command
and control structure of a military unit for the purpose of engaging
in armed hostilities. These latter elements of belligerent status are
reflected in the requirement that the individual carry arms openly
and conduct operations in accordance with the laws of war—both
of which imply exercising a belligerent function.57 Accordingly,
54 See, e.g., CTR. FOR ARMY LEADERSHIP, DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARMY LEADERSHIP:
COMPETENT, CONFIDENT, AND AGILE (2006), available at http://usacac.army.mil
/cac2/Repository/Materials/fm6-22.pdf (noting that the U.S. Army’s oath
requires that “[s]oldiers simultaneously acknowledge the authority of the
President as Commander in Chief and officers as his agents” and that “[t]he
purpose of the oath is to affirm military subordination to civilian authority”); see
also Yamashita v. Styer, 66 S. Ct. 340, 353–58 (1946) (J. Murphy dissenting)
(arguing that the majority’s reasoning for charging the Japanese General with war
atrocities committed by troops under his command but which he did not order
was without precedent in international law and a violation of due process); Corn,
supra note 24, at 259–61 (proposing the functional discretion test as “an alternate
approach for determining the legal limits of using civilian personnel” in
battlefield support functions).
55 See COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 45–48
(overviewing early dialogue concerning defining a “belligerent” and noting that
1907 Hague regulations ultimately employed “that of being commanded by a person
responsible for his subordinates” as one of the required elements for obtaining
belligerent status).
56 The Westphalian system refers to the balance-of-power system that arose
out of the 1648 Peace of Westphalia in which the power of a state was determined
by the number of other states with “substantially equal strength.” HENRY
KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 21 (1994). See also WOUNDED AND SICK COMMENTARY, supra
note 38, at 43–44 (noting states’ objections to providing legal recognition to rebel
groups and objecting to allowing such groups protection under Article 3 when
engaging in acts of aggression); GIULIANA ZICCARDI CAPALDO, THE PILLARS OF
GLOBAL LAW tbl. 1 (2008) (characterizing states’ sovereignty within the
Westphalian system as containing “[i]ndependence and supreme authority . . .
within their territory”).
57 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art.
4, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (describing prisoners of war as, inter alia, either
members of the armed forces, members of the militia, or persons who accompany
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subordination to the authority of belligerent group leadership for
the purpose of engaging in hostilities at the direction of that
leadership is the true sine qua non of belligerent status. As the
DPH Study notes:
Organized armed groups belonging to a non-State party to
an armed conflict include both dissident armed forces and
other organized armed groups. Dissident armed forces
essentially constitute part of a State’s armed forces that
have turned against the government. Other organized
armed groups recruit their members primarily from the
civilian population but develop a sufficient degree of
military organization to conduct hostilities on behalf of a
party to the conflict, albeit not always with the same means,
intensity and level of sophistication as State armed forces.58
This language indicates another acknowledgment that NIAC
involves hostilities between armed belligerent groups—in the
terminology of Common Article 3, “Parties” to an armed conflict.59
If this is true (as the author believes it is), then it seems logical that
the key factor in determining belligerent status—particularly for
non-state operatives—cannot be the state subordination element.
Instead, the key factor is membership in the belligerent
organization exercising a function historically associated with
belligerent operatives, namely participating in hostilities. This is
precisely the equation proposed by the DPH Study to distinguish
between a genuine civilian and a member of a non-state belligerent
group:
Consequently, under IHL, the decisive criterion for
individual membership in an organized armed group is
whether a person assumes a continuous function for the
group involving his or her direct participation in hostilities
(hereafter: “continuous combat function”).60

members of the armed forces or the militia, and thus suggesting that a prisoner of
war is someone who likely exercised a belligerent function).
58 Melzer, supra note 2, at 31–32.
59 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, at 27 (“In the case of armed conflict not of an international
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to
the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions.”).
60 See Melzer, supra note 2, at 33.
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With the exception of dissident armed forces (whose “status” as
belligerents is revealed by their membership in an armed force
formerly loyal to government authority), determining NIAC
belligerent status is unquestionably complex. Lacking the prospect
of combatant immunity, there is little incentive for non-state
operatives to wear uniforms or other insignia that distinguish them
from the civilian population.61 As a result, it is often difficult to
determine the difference between civilians and non-state
belligerent operatives based on outward appearance. Instead, the
difference will almost inevitably turn on the nature of the
individuals’ conduct. When that conduct indicates the individual
is acting as an agent of the belligerent group leadership for the
purpose of engaging in hostile functions, it in effect establishes
belligerent status.
Herein is the ultimate complexity of acknowledging belligerent
status in NIAC: while it is this status that subjects the operative to
the scope of targeting authority identical to that applicable to a
combatant in IAC, determining that status inevitably requires
assessment of individual conduct.62
Focusing on relevant
indicators to determine belligerent status is nothing new. This has
always been an aspect of the execution of military operations
during armed conflict, what military operators would call threat
recognition.63 What complicates this process in the NIAC context
61 See Geoffrey S. Corn, Thinking the Unthinkable: Has the Time Come to Offer
Combatant Immunity to Non-State Actors?, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 253, 262–63
(2011) (noting that the United States deemed Taliban fighters unlawful enemy
combatants not because “they were not fighting on behalf of a state,” but rather
because “they failed to meet the ‘right of person’ component . . . [by failing] to
wear a distinctive uniform”).
62 Compare Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 43

The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed
forces, groups, and units which are under a command responsible to that
Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented
by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse party.,
with Protocol II, supra note 35, art. 13(3) (providing no definition of combatant, but
mandating that civilians be protected from attack unless they take a direct part in
hostilities, thereby requiring a conduct-biased analysis in the context of a NIAC).

See Appendix B, A Soldier’s Task: Use Force Appropriately,
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report
/call/call_96-6_roeappb1.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2011)
(describing the procedures Army personnel should follow in
63
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is the reality that the indicators of threat recognition (belligerent
status) are rarely as concrete and overt as in the traditional IAC
context. The evolving nature of NIAC, which today includes
armed hostilities between states and transnational non-state
It is critical,
groups, further exacerbates this complexity.64
however, to distinguish between targeting authority triggered by
status and targeting authority triggered by conduct, even when
conduct is the key “threat recognition” factor resulting in status.
Thus, while conduct is the key analytical indicator of status, this
does not equate to conduct-based targeting authority—the type of
authority utilized to respond to a genuine DPH situation.65
This conduct based status determination is the true significance
of the CCF concept endorsed in the DPH Study when applied in
the NIAC context.66 In essence, in NIAC, CCF is a methodology to
assess belligerent status and thereby trigger status-based targeting
authority.67 As a method of assessing status, CCF is therefore
merely a threat recognition equation that leads to a status
anticipating or responding to threats and determining the amount
of force needed under the circumstances).

64 See, e.g., Obama Declares America ‘At War’ with Al Qaeda, Offers New Security
Initiatives, CNSNEWS (Jan. 7, 2010), http://www.cnsnews.com/node/59446
(reporting that President Obama declared that America is “at war against al
Qaeda”).
65 A genuine DPH situation refers to a situation in which a civilian is engaged
in “acts, which by their nature and purpose are intended to cause actual harm to
the personnel and equipment of the armed forces. Thus . . . becom[ing] a
legitimate target, [but] only for as long as he takes part in hostilities.”
COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 618.
66 The report remarks:
Consequently, under IHL, the decisive criterion for individual
membership in an organized armed group is whether a person
assumes a continuous function for the group involving his or
her direct participation in hostilities (hereafter: “continuous
combat function”). Continuous combat function does not
imply de jure entitlement to combatant privilege. Rather, it
distinguishes members of the organized fighting forces of a
non-state party from civilians who directly participate in
hostilities on a merely spontaneous, sporadic, or unorganized
basis, or who assume exclusively political, administrative or
other non-combat functions.
Melzer, supra note 2, at 33–34 (footnotes omitted).
67 See id. at 36 (providing the standard used for determining the targetability
of belligerents in a NIAC: “In non-international armed conflict, organized armed
groups constitute the armed forces of a non-State party to the conflict and consist
only of individuals whose continuous function it is to take a direct part in
hostilities (“continuous combat function”)).
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determination triggering accordant targeting authority. It is not a
method for determining when a civilian’s conduct justifies a hostile
response because of DPH (conduct based targeting authority).68
CCF is therefore merely the threat recognition criterion that is used
to confirm belligerent status, a conclusion reflected in the DPH
Study:
Continuous combat function requires lasting integration
into an organized armed group acting as the armed forces of a
non-State party to an armed conflict. Thus, individuals whose
continuous function involves the preparation, execution, or
command of acts or operations amounting to direct
participation in hostilities are assuming a continuous
combat function. An individual recruited, trained and
equipped by such a group to continuously and directly
participate in hostilities on its behalf can be considered to
assume a continuous combat function even before he or she
first carries out a hostile act.
This case must be
distinguished from persons comparable to reservists who,
after a period of basic training or active membership, leave
the armed group and re-integrate into civilian life. Such
“reservists” are civilians until and for such time as they are
called back to active duty.69
This test provides a logical and workable method to trigger status
based targeting authority in NIAC. While it is obviously less clearcut than reliance on uniforms to distinguish combatants from
civilians, it accounts for two realities. First, as the DPH Study
emphasizes, members of organized belligerent groups in NIAC
(individuals who are presumed hostile to friendly forces and
therefore subject to a presumption of targetability) are a distinct
category from civilians.70 Second, the lack of any real incentive for
members of these groups to wear distinctive uniforms or insignia
necessitates reliance on their patterns of conduct as the principal

68 See id. at 45 (explaining that DPH “refers to specific hostile acts carried out
by individuals” but not mentioning CCF).
69 Id. at 34 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
70 See id. (“Individuals who continuously accompany or support an
organized armed group, but whose function does not involve direct participation
in hostilities, are not members of that group within the meaning of IHL. Instead,
they remain civilians assuming support functions, similar to private contractors
and civilian employees accompanying State armed forces.”).
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threat recognition criterion used to assess when they are part of an
“enemy” party to the conflict.71
The CCF test has, however, contributed to the flawed inference
that non-state operatives cannot be characterized as belligerents,
but must instead be treated as civilians.72 The CCF focus on
individual conduct is interpreted by some as simply indicating a
special class of civilians taking a direct part in hostilities. This
leads to the erroneous conclusion that CCF derived targeting
authority is analogous to what military operators know as
71

See id. at 35.

In practice, the principle of distinction must be applied based on
information which is practically available and can reasonably be
regarded as reliable in the prevailing circumstances. A continuous
combat function may be openly expressed through the carrying of
uniforms, distinctive signs, or certain weapons. Yet it may also be
identified on the basis of conclusive behavior, for example where a
person has repeatedly directly participated in hostilities in support of an
organized armed group in circumstances indicating that such conduct
constitutes a continuous function rather than a spontaneous, sporadic, or
temporary role assumed for the duration of a particular operation.
Id.
See generally Bill Boothby, “And for Such Time As”: The Time Dimension to
Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 741 (2010) (finding
civilians lose protection under the Guidance when engaging in acts of preparation
for direct participation); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, The ICRC Interpretive
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International
Humanitarian Law: An Introduction to the Forum, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 637
(2010) (critiquing the four critical perspectives on the interpretation of DPH); Nils
Melzer, Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response to
Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation
in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 831 (2010) (arguing that the ICRC’s
position on the definition of membership in an organized armed force can be
accurately understood when Guidance sections are conjunctively read); W. Hays
Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No
Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 769 (2010) (providing a
critical historical analysis of the Guidance regarding the protection of civilians
during war); Michael N. Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities:
The Constitutive Elements, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 697 (2010) (explaining that
civilians who “directly participate” in hostilities are not protected from attack);
Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in
Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 5 (2010) (noting that the
Guidance formula for international armed conflict defines civilians negatively);
Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC “Direct
Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 641
(2010) (arguing that “organized armed groups” are classified with unique criteria
and are not considered civilian).
72
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conduct-based rules of engagement.73 While this error will be
addressed in more detail below, in summary it conflates the focus
on conduct to assess membership (thereby triggering status based
targeting authority) with the focus on individual conduct to
determine when a civilian loses presumptive protection from
attack.
It is true that the ultimate outcome of both of these equations is
a justified use of force. However, the impact of competing
presumptions associated with status versus conduct based
targeting authority indicates there are important, albeit subtle,
second and third order consequences resulting from this erroneous
interpretation. The conclusion that use of force is permitted
against both a civilian directly participating in hostilities and a
member of an armed belligerent group therefore does not justify
interpreting CCF in NIAC as a test to determine when a civilian is
directly participating in hostilities as opposed to when the civilian
becomes a member of a belligerent group. It is the thesis of this
Article that CCF in NIAC establishes belligerent group status and
not simply a temporary loss of civilian protection from attack. This
is because integration into the belligerent forces of a non-state
group is functionally synonymous with integration into a
combatant force in IAC. Indeed, the DPH Study seems to
emphasize this consequence of CCF in NIAC:
[I]t distinguishes members of the organized fighting forces
of a non-State party from civilians who directly participate
in hostilities on a merely spontaneous, sporadic, or
unorganized basis, or who assume exclusively political,
administrative or other non-combat functions.74
It is obviously significant that the term “distinguishes” is used in
this passage, for it confirms that individuals who engage in a CCF
in NIAC must be distinguished from civilians, even those civilians
who take a direct part in hostilities.

73 Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric Talbot Jenson, Untying the Gordian Knot: A Proposal
for Determining Applicability of the Laws of War to the War on Terror, 81 TEMPLE L.
REV. 787, 815–18 (2008) (noting instances where the United States has employed
conduct-based rules of engagement as justifications for carrying out targeted
attacks).
74 See Melzer, supra note 2, at 33–34.
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WHY THE USE OF CONDUCT TO ESTABLISH STATUS
UNDERMINES THE EXTENSION OF THE DPH RULE
TO DEFINE ENEMY BELLIGERENT FORCES

It is clear that both organizational status and DPH—whether
assessed on a case-by-case basis or pursuant to the CCF test—
result in lawful targetability.75 This raises an obvious question
related to targeting individuals hostile to a friendly force: Why
does it matter whether forces apply status or conduct-based
targeting authority? This question has certainly become more
difficult to answer in the wake of the CCF test, which mitigates the
consequence between status and conduct based targeting
authority. However, treating CCF as a form of civilian conduct
triggering targeting authority dilutes the authority to address
threats to friend forces emanating from organized belligerent
groups.
Such dilution should be unacceptable—to both
belligerents and, perhaps surprisingly, civilians.
All battlefield targeting authority falls into two broad
categories: status and conduct based. Status based targeting
authority is, as described above, triggered by the determination
that a proposed object of attack is a member of an opposition
belligerent force.76 In contrast, conduct based targeting is based on
the determination that an individual presumed inoffensive is
engaged in conduct hostile to the friendly force.77 Accordingly,
status based targeting has always typified the traditional
conception of armed hostilities between armed forces, whereas

75 See Protocol II, supra note 35, art. 13(3) (allowing for the targeting of
civilians “for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”); see also Melzer,
supra note 2, at 36 (suggesting allowance of targeting of such individuals who
serve a “continuous combat function”).
76 See Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 43(1)–(2):

1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed
forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to that
Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is represented
by a government or an authority not recognized by an adverse Party.
Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system
which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international
law applicable in armed conflict.
2. Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than
medical personnel and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third
Convention) are combatants, that is to say, they have the right to
participate directly in hostilities.
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conduct based targeting reflects more of a constabulary function
performed by the armed forces in the context of armed hostilities.
This dichotomy is reflected in the traditional DPH equation.
Prior to the advent of the CCF test, DPH was an extremely
restrictive concept. Only when a civilian engaged in conduct that
would result in actual and immediate harm to an armed force did
he lose legal protection from being made the deliberate object of
attack.78 This test was and remains premised on a critical
presumption: civilians are inoffensive and deviation from that
condition is an exceptional situation.79 Accordingly, because the
evidence supporting attack must be sufficient to prove a gross
deviation from the presumed standard of behavior, the burden of
risk is placed squarely on the responding armed force.80
The allocation of risk resulting from status-based targeting
decisions is fundamentally different. The determination of hostile
status triggers the opposite presumption from that afforded to
civilians: that members of the opposition group represent an
actual and ongoing threat of hostility to friendly forces. A status
determination triggers the authority, derived from the principle of
military necessity, to take “those measures not forbidden by
international law which are indispensable for securing the
complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible.”81 It is
critical to recognize that this authority is not confined to the
individual. Reference to “the enemy” indicates (in accordance
with the customary nature of armed hostilities) that it is the
77 See Protocol II, supra note 35, art. 13(3) (allowing for the targeting of
civilians “for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”).
78 See COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 618–19.

The immunity afforded individual civilians is subject to an overriding
condition, namely, on their abstaining from all hostile acts. Hostile acts
should be understood to be acts which by their nature and purpose are
intended to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the
armed forces. Thus a civilian who takes part in armed combat, either
individually or as part of a group, thereby becomes a legitimate target,
though only for as long as he takes part in hostilities.
Id.
79 See id. at 618–19 (distinguishing between civilians directly participating in
hostilities and those who are merely participating in the war effort).
80 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Boškoski, Case No. IT-04-82-A, Judgment on Appeal,
paras. 79–86 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 19, 2010) (noting
that the burden of proof is not shifted from the armed force making the attack just
because there is insufficient evidence in regards to the appearance of the victim).
81 See DEPT. OF THE ARMY, supra note 42, ¶ 3(a) (emphasis added).
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opposition organization, and not just individual operatives of the
organization, that is the legitimate objective of submission.82
Accordingly, the law authorizes resort to deadly force immediately
upon the belligerent status determination.
Perhaps more
importantly, because members of opposition belligerent groups
qualify as lawful military objectives as a result of their status, the
status determination triggers the legal authority to employ force
against them as a measure of first resort, with no requirement to
exhaust less than lethal means of subduing the threat. This reflects
an axiom of targeting law: the burden of risk associated with
armed hostilities is placed squarely on members of armed
belligerent groups for as long as their status remains extant. They
remain subject to attack unless and until they take affirmative
action to rebut the presumption of threat, specifically by surrender
or by being made combat ineffective as the result of wounds or
some other disability.83
The CCF test certainly represents an important step forward in
reconciling the concept of direct participation with the reality of
contemporary armed conflicts.
However, it confuses these
competing but complementary presumptions because it straddles a
line between status and conduct based targeting authority,
blurring the resulting operative targeting presumptions.84 While
CCF indicates the individual is a member of an enemy belligerent
group, the test is clearly conduct oriented, and the consequence of
satisfying the test embedded within the DPH rule.85 As a result, a

82 The qualifier “not forbiddened by international law” indicates that the
authority to inflict harm terminates once an opponent is rendered hors de combat
(out of combat by reason of wounds, sickness, or capture). See id.; Protocol I, supra
note 1, art. 41.
83 See Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 41(2)(a)-(c) (describing the three types of
persons hors de combat as being those who are captured by adverse party, show an
intention to surrender, or have been incapacitated from wounds or illness).
84 See Melzer, supra note 2, at 27–36 (commenting on the “mutual
exclusiveness of the concepts of civilian, armed forces, and organized armed
groups”).
85 See id. at 36.

For the purposes of the principle of distinction in non-international
armed conflict, all persons who are not members of state armed forces or
organized armed groups of a party to the conflict are civilians and,
therefore, entitled to protection against direct attack unless and for such
time as they take a direct part in hostilities in non-international armed
conflict, organized armed groups constitute the armed forces of a nonstate party to the conflict and consist only of individuals whose
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CCF determination results in the loss of presumptive protection
from attack, just as actually firing a weapon at a military force
would result in the loss of protection for a civilian acting
individually.86 However, because it is associated with a rule
resulting in the loss of civilian protection, it risks becoming the
exclusive test for assessing the targetability of individuals not
incorporated into an armed force subordinate to state authority
and control—namely non-state belligerent groups in NIAC. This is
highly problematic because it effectively renders all non-state
actors civilians, who in turn, benefit from presumptive protection
from attack.
It is notable that the ICRC recognized in the DPH Study that
such an interpretation is unjustified, and that it diminishes the
protection of the civilian population at large.87 This recognition is
absolutely appropriate. As the ICRC notes, the principle of
distinction depends on the recognition of opposing belligerent
groups, for such recognition facilitates targeting categorizations
during armed conflict.88 In effect, this is a concession that the legal
authority for targeting such groups is based on a fundamentally
different presumption than that applicable to civilians directly
participating in hostilities—even those falling within the CCF test.
Nonetheless, the DPH Study itself reflects an ongoing uncertainty
as to the exact effect of the CCF concept, which contributes to the
broader uncertainty as to the presence of non-state belligerent
groups. The most profound example of this is Section IX of the
Study.89
continuous function it is to take a direct part in hostilities (“continuous
combat function”).
Id.
86 Firing a weapon at a military force would be an act “which by [its] nature
and purpose are intended to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of
the armed forces” and therefore would result in loss of protection for the civilian.
See COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 618.
87 See Melzer, supra note 2, 27–28 (remarking that unclear boundaries between
civilians and non-State armed forces will result in potential harms for the civilian
population).
88 See id. at 28 (“[T]his approach would seriously undermine the conceptual
integrity of the categories of persons underlying the principle of distinction, most
notably because it would create parties to non-international armed conflicts
whose entire armed forces remain part of the civilian population.”).
89 See id. at 77–82 (suggesting an imperative necessity to maintain restraint
and proportionality even when dealing with an organized, albeit non-State,
armed force).
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INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE SCHIZOPHRENIA

4.1. CCF and the Minimum Force Requirement
Perhaps the most significant practical distinction between
status and conduct based targeting authority is the effect of the
principle of proportionality.90 Because a determination that an
individual is a member of an enemy belligerent group triggers
status based targeting, the LOAC has always permitted the
attacking force to employ deadly force as a measure of first resort.
In other words, status indicates the individual is a lawful military
objective: a person, place, or thing subject to lawful attack.91 This
authority is in no way qualified by the rule of proportionality.
Instead, the only limitation on the selection of methods and/or
means of warfare to attack a military objective (beyond the initial
targetability determination) is the prohibition against the
calculated infliction of unnecessary suffering.92
It could be argued that the unnecessary suffering prohibition
implicitly imposes a proportionality obligation. This is, however,
incorrect. The foundation of the rule prohibiting unnecessary
suffering is the bar against the employment of weapons (means) or
tactics (methods) against a lawful object of attack calculated to cause
superfluous injury or suffering.93 What is superfluous? This has
unquestionably been a vexing LOAC question. However, the
nature of military doctrine, training, tactics, and operations all

90 Proportionality requires that armed forces refrain from any “attack which
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” Protocol I, supra note
1, art. 57(2)(a)(iii).
91 See id. art. 52(2).

Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects
are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by
their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite
military advantage.
Id.

92 See id. art. 35(2) (“It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and
material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or
unnecessary suffering.”).
93 See id. art. 35(1) (giving Parties the right to “choose methods and means of
warfare”) (emphasis added).
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indicate that causing death, as a measure of first resort is not
considered legally superfluous.94
In fact, deliberately inflicting injuries that cannot be treated—
for example permanent loss of sight or hearing—is far more likely
to be considered to run afoul of this rule than killing the same
enemy belligerent.95 This might seem oxymoronic, but it is a
reflection of the customary understanding that employing methods
and means of warfare with the objective of causing death as a
measure of first resort is consistent with the fundamental authority
derived from the principle of military necessity to take all
measures necessary to bring about the prompt submission of an
enemy organization.
This conclusion is reinforced by one of the most important
rules in AP I: Article 51(5).96 Commonly called the proportionality
rule, Article 51(5) prohibits attacks on lawful military objectives
when the commander anticipates that the attack will produce
excessive collateral damage or incidental injury.97 It is clear that
the beneficiaries of this rule are not the objects of attack (military
objectives), but instead victims of collateral effects, namely
civilians.98 The benefit afforded to the objects of attack is purely
gratuitous—an otherwise lawful attack against military objectives
is prohibited not because of the disproportionate effect it will have

94

See SOLIS, supra note 2, at 270.

“Warfare . . . justifies subjecting an enemy to massive and decisive force,
and the suffering that it brings. Military necessity only justifies the
infliction of suffering upon an enemy combatant . . . . [H]owever . . .
military necessity only justifies the infliction of as much suffering as is
necessary to bring about the submission of an enemy.” Military
necessity is the balance between destruction of the enemy and humanity.
Id. (quoting Geoffrey Corn, International & Operational Law Note: Principal 4:
Preventing Unnecessary Suffering, THE ARMY LAWYER 1, 50-51 (1998)).
95 See Disarmament: The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, UNOG,
http://www.unog.ch/80256ee600585943/(httppages)/4f0def093b4860b4c1257180
004b1b30?opendocument (last visited Nov. 15, 2011) (outlining the prohibition on
certain types of weapons which cause unnecessary suffering).
96 Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 51(5).
97 Id. art. 51(5)(b) (“An attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss
of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated.”) (emphasis added).
98 Article 51 of API is entitled “Protection of the Civilian Population.” Id. art.
51 (stating that civilians must be accorded protection against dangers arising from
military operations).
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on them, but because of the desire to protect civilians and or
civilian property in their vicinity.99
No analogous proportionality protection is afforded to lawful
objects of attack, including enemy belligerent forces.100
Accordingly, it is legally impossible to employ excessive force
against the deliberate and lawful object of violence in armed
conflict; those objects may be attacked with whatever amount of
force is considered necessary to bring about their immediate
submission.101 Perhaps more importantly, it is common practice to
use overwhelming force against such enemy objectives in order to
influence the subsequent behavior of enemy leadership and other
enemy forces.102 Of course, once the enemy belligerent is rendered
hors de combat by wounds, sickness, or capture, he no longer
qualifies as a lawful object of attack.103 But the protection afforded
to such an individual is in no way derived from a proportionality
requirement; it is simply the result of the fact that the individual is
no longer capable of engaging in belligerent conduct as an agent of
the enemy belligerent leadership.104
If CCF is merely a threat recognition methodology resulting in
a belligerent status determination, then individuals engaging in
CCF should be subject to attack without any proportionality-based
constraint.
The DPH Study, however, suggests a contrary
conclusion. In Section IX, the DPH Study indicates that the use of
force directed against individuals falling within the CCF definition

99 Id. art. 51(1) (stating that Article 51 was written to increase the protection of
civilians under LOAC).
100 See generally Protocol I, supra note 1.
101 See, e.g., id. arts. 48, 51, 57 (providing restrictions on otherwise lawful
attacks for the protection of the civilian population but providing no protection or
formula for restraint for purely military objectives).
102 See, e.g., Sue Chan, Iraq Faces Massive U.S. Missile Barrage, CBS NEWS (Jan.
24,
2003),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/01/24/eveningnews
/main537928.shtml (describing the war plan prior to the invasion of Iraq that
would have called for an attack of 800 cruise missiles over two days against
Baghdad in order to bring about the “psychological destruction of the enemy’s
will to fight”).
103 See Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 41 (“A person…hors de combat shall not be
made the object of attack.”).
104 COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 482 (“It is
a fundamental principle of the law of war that those who do not participate in the
hostilities shall not be attacked. In this respect harmless civilians and soldiers hors
de combat are a priori on the same footing.”).
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is subject to such a constraint.105 However, even the purported
source of this constraint reveals the invalidity of this proposition.
As noted above, jus in bello proportionality does not protect
enemy belligerent operatives who qualify as objects of deliberate
attack.106 As a result, Section IX is unsupported by any positive or
customary LOAC obligation. This is essentially conceded in the
Study when it cites the general principle of humanity as the source
of the constraint. According to Section IX:
In the absence of express regulation, the kind and degree of
force permissible in attacks against legitimate military
targets should be determined, first of all, based on the
fundamental principles of military necessity and humanity .
...
While it is impossible to determine, ex ante, the precise
amount of force to be used in each situation, considerations
of humanity require that, within the parameters set by the
specific provisions of IHL, no more death, injury, or
destruction be caused than is actually necessary for the
accomplishment of a legitimate military purpose in the
prevailing circumstances . . . .
In sum, while operating forces can hardly be required to
take additional risks for themselves or the civilian
population in order to capture an armed adversary alive, it
would defy basic notions of humanity to kill an adversary
or to refrain from giving him or her an opportunity to
surrender where there manifestly is no necessity for the use
of lethal force. In such situations, the principles of military
necessity and of humanity play an important role in
determining the kind and degree of permissible force
against legitimate military targets.107
This application of the principle of humanity may seem appealing,
but it is fundamentally inconsistent with the scope of authority
established by the principle of military objective. This principle, as
105 Melzer, supra note 2, at 77 (“Loss of protection from direct attack, whether
due to direct participation in hostilities (civilians) or continuous combat function
(members of organized armed groups), does not mean that the persons concerned
fall outside the law.”).
106 Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 51(5)(b) (providing protection for civilians and
not other parties).
107 Melzer, supra note 2, at 80–82.
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explained above, allows for or restricts deliberate attack authority
based on presumptions, presumptions that are inherently overbroad and under-inclusive.108 Nonetheless, these presumptions
provide for a certain degree of clarity and consistency in an
otherwise chaotic environment.
It is clear that Section IX was motivated by the reality that
application of the CCF concept would expand the scope of lawful
targeting based on a determination of DPH. This likely produced
discomfort: deliberate attack authority applicable to individuals
who perform a CCF but who, at the moment when force is applied
against them, may not be identifiable as belligerents based on
conduct which creates an imminent risk to friendly forces. It also
seems clear that the ICRC understood the minimal authority for
applying a proportionality qualifier to belligerents. In justifying
this purported limitation, the DPH Study begins by conceding that
it will rarely apply to a lawful combatant in the IAC context:
In classic large-scale confrontations between well-equipped
and organized armed forces or groups, the principles of
military necessity and of humanity are unlikely to restrict
the use of force against legitimate military targets beyond
what is already required by specific provisions of IHL.109
The discussion then shifts the focus to the civilian engaged in DPH,
revealing its palpable discomfort with subjecting such a civilian to
targeting authority analogous in scope to that applicable to the
traditional combatant:
The practical importance of their restraining function will
increase with the ability of a party to the conflict to control
the circumstances and area in which its military operations
are conducted, and may become decisive where armed
forces operate against selected individuals in situations
comparable to peacetime policing.
In practice, such
considerations are likely to become particularly relevant
where a party to the conflict exercises effective territorial
control, most notably in occupied territories and noninternational armed conflicts.

108 Id. at 80 (conceding that “it is impossible to determine . . . the precise
amount of force to be used”).
109 Id.
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For example, an unarmed civilian sitting in a restaurant
using a radio or mobile phone to transmit tactical targeting
intelligence to an attacking air force would probably have
to be regarded as directly participating in hostilities.
Should the restaurant in question be situated within an area
firmly controlled by the opposing party, however, it may be
possible to neutralize the military threat posed by that
civilian through capture or other non-lethal means without
additional risk to the operating forces or the surrounding
civilian population.110
As will be explained below, restricting this asserted targeting
authority qualification to this type of civilian engaging in DPH
(ostensibly in the IAC context) is arguably defensible. However, in
a classic manifestation of the proverbial ‘slippery slope’, the DPH
Study then extends the qualification to the NIAC non-state
belligerent:
Similarly, under IHL, an insurgent military commander of
an organized armed group would not regain civilian
protection against direct attack simply because he
temporarily discarded his weapons, uniform and
distinctive signs in order to visit relatives inside
government-controlled territory. Nevertheless, depending
on the circumstances, the armed or police forces of the
government may be able to capture that commander
without resorting to lethal force.111
This one paragraph reveals the inherent schizophrenia of
Section IX. It is simply incompatible with the DPH Study’s implicit
(if not explicit) recognition that CCF in the NIAC context results
not in limited targetability, but instead on belligerent status. In
essence, Section IX is an attempt to “re-civilianize” the NIAC nonstate belligerent by cloaking that operative with a proportionality
protection.112 However, imposing a minimum necessary force
obligation on government forces engaged in armed conflict against
non-state belligerents is inconsistent with the concession that CCF

Id. at 80–81 (emphasis added).
Id. at 81.
112 See id. (noting that civilians must be taken into account in the
proportionality assessment of a military operation that is likely to cause incidental
harm to civilians).
110
111
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produces belligerent status, and with the overall concept of status
based targeting presumptions.
This proposed application of a unitary minimum necessary
force qualifier to both civilians engaging in DPH in the IAC context
(to include in an occupied area) and non-state belligerents is
problematic on a broader level. By applying a force limitation rule
ostensibly justified vis-à-vis civilians (even those taking a direct
part in hostilities) to non-state belligerents, Section IX confuses the
effect of CCF in the NIAC context. This confusion has, in the
opinion of the authors, contributed to the more widespread
misconception that non-state belligerents are merely civilians
engaged in DPH who remain civilians while they are so engaged
(albeit subject to use of force). However, the mixing of armed
conflict and law enforcement response authority reflected in the
above extract from Section IX exposes the danger of this premise.113
In short, continuing to characterize these belligerent operatives as
civilian leads to an inevitable but impermissible outcome: the
dilution of state targeting authority and a corresponding lessening
of the protection of the civilian population writ large.
This outcome is not only unjustified and inconsistent with
status based targeting principles, it is arguably perverse, for it vests
an unprivileged belligerent with greater protection than the
privileged counterpart. As noted above, the DPH Study at least
implicitly concedes CCF in NIAC results in belligerent status—a
method of identifying members of organized armed groups (a
party to an armed conflict).114 However, applying the Section IX
minimum force qualification to these belligerent operatives would
grant them protection from being made the object of attack with
the use of deadly force as a first resort.115 No analogous protection
applies to lawful combatants, who by virtue of that status are
subject to such risk so long as they capable of acting as agents of
enemy leadership.116

113 See id. at 80–82 (implying that proportionality might require that
identifiable members of belligerent armed groups be non-lethally arrested,
whether by the State’s armed or police forces).
114 See id. at 81 (proffering example of civilians directly participating in
hostilities).
115 See id. at 79 (forbidding causing injury or destruction when not necessary
in order to accomplish a legitimate military objective).
116 COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 482 (“It is
a fundamental principle of the law of war that those who do not participate in the
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Why the ICRC would propose such a minimum force
qualification is understandable. By conceding CCF results in
belligerent status for NIAC non-state operatives, the DPH Study
conceded a broad scope of targeting authority for government
forces. However, the CCF concept itself reflects the reality that
threat identification in this context is far more complex than in
traditional IAC—because clear objective criteria of belligerent
status are rarely available.117 Accordingly, the risk of error in the
status decision is obviously increased vis-à-vis a non-state
operative. Imposing a minimum force qualification on targeting
authority would obviously mitigate that risk by requiring the
attacking commander to forego the use of deadly force wherever
and whenever feasible.
This anomaly was apparently not lost on the ICRC. Instead of
accounting for it by drawing a bright line between belligerent
targeting authority and the authority to use force in response to a
civilian taking a direct part in hostilities, Section IX used it as an
opportunity to open another front: extending the minimum
necessary force obligation to all enemy belligerents.118 The
DPH
Study cites Jean Pictet in support of this extension. However, in
the same footnote, the DPH Study concedes that:
During the expert meetings, it was generally recognized
that the approach proposed by Pictet is unlikely to be
operable in classic battlefield situations involving largescale confrontations (Report DPH 2006, pp. 75f., 78) and
that armed forces operating in situations of armed conflict,
even if equipped with sophisticated weaponry and means
of observation, may not always have the means or

hostilities shall not be attacked. In this respect harmless civilians and soldiers hors
de combat are a priori on the same footing.”).
117 In a traditional IAC combatants are required to distinguish themselves
from the civilian population, but in a modern NIAC non-state forces have no
desire or incentive to do so. See Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 44(3), (obliging
combatants to distinguish themselves in combat in order to protect civilian
populations); see also, Geoffrey S. Corn, Thinking the Unthinkable: Has the Time Come
to Offer Combatant Immunity to Non-State Actors?, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 253
(2011) (arguing for the extension of lawful combatant status as a means of
ensuring compliance with humanitarian law).
118 See Melzer, supra note 2, at 82 (“[I]t would defy basic notions of humanity
to kill an adversary or to refrain from giving him or her an opportunity to
surrender where there manifestly is no necessity for the use of lethal force.”).
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opportunity to capture rather than kill (Report DPH 2006,
p. 63).119
Indeed, opposition to this interpretation as fatally flawed is
reflected in subsequent scholarly critiques by members of the DPH
working group, which notes that it is inconsistent with the
widespread and customary understanding of status based
targeting authority.120
Why would the ICRC muddy the proverbial waters with this
overreaching? The most obvious reason, as noted above, is that it
was considered necessary to offset the inherent expansion in risk to
presumptive civilians produced by the CCF concept. However, by
asserting the constraint applied to NIAC belligerents, the
proponents of Section IX produced an anomaly that could only be
eliminated by asserting that the minimum necessary force
requirement applies to all enemy belligerents, even traditional
combatants. In this regard, it must be emphasized, the DPH
Study’s concession that application of this constraint will often be
impracticable in traditional force on force combat, in no way
suggests that the obligation is inapplicable in that context. Instead,
Section IX injects another feasible precaution obligation into the
use of combat power in any armed conflict. Unfortunately, unlike
all other such obligations, which are intended to mitigate the
collateral impact on civilians as the result of attacking a lawful
objective, the beneficiary of this asserted obligation is the lawful
and deliberate object of attack itself.
4.2. Conflating of law and policy
There may be—and indeed often are—policy and operational
rationale for imposing a minimum force requirement on
government forces combating non-state belligerent groups.
Indeed, the history of armed conflict is replete with examples of
commanders imposing restraints on their forces in order to achieve
some tactical, operational, or strategic objective.121 But couching
Id. at 82 n.221.
See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing flawed inferences
related to who can be treated as a civilian for DPH purposes).
119
120

121 See Andrew Curry, Don’t Shoot Until You See the Whites of Their Eyes!,
MILITARY
CHANNEL,
http://military.discovery.com/history/revolutionarywar/bunker-hill/bunker-hill-2.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2011) (noting that the
colonial armies forced delay in opening fire in order to maximize British casualties
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the requirement as a legal constraint at best conflates lex lata and de
lege ferenda.122 At worse, the conflation, while cloaked in terms of
humanity, will add uncertainty in the already complex NIAC
environment and, ultimately, result in increased civilian casualties.
The conflation also confuses the differing considerations through
which the use of force is limited: legal, policy, and operational.
While the term “rules of engagement” (ROE) is commonly
misunderstood to mean the laws of armed conflict (LOAC), the
ROE are a subset of the LOAC. The LOAC forms the outer, and
legal, bounds of permissible conduct in hostilities.
Those
parameters are further reduced, not legally, but through a host of
policy considerations, including political and diplomatic.123
Military commanders also impose restraints and limitations on
their forces.124 The results of limiting conduct due to policy and
operational considerations are the ROE. But to contend that
because the ROE are a subset of the LOAC and that the ROE
contain limitations on the use of force means the limitations derive
from the LOAC is a sophism.
The practice of policy and operationally based limitations on
what the LOAC would otherwise permit is not limited to
operations against unconventional threats in a NIAC. Yet,
during the early stages of the American Revolution); see also HEADQUARTERS DEP’T
OF THE ARMY, FM3–24 COUNTERINSURGENCY ch.1, at 5–12 (2006) (discussing the
moral and strategic need for restraint in counterinsurgency operations, such as the
need to avoid turning the populace against the counterinsurgency effort due to
collateral or intentional injuries to innocents).
122 In other words, conflating what the law is with what the law should be.
See “Beck’s Law Dictionary”: A Compendium of International Law Terms and Phrases,
http://people.virginia.edu/~rjb3v/latin.html#lex lata (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
123 See CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INSTRUCTION 3121.01A,
STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR US FORCES (Jan. 15, 2000) (establishing
guidelines for the use of force by U.S. forces operating in different environments).
The standing rules of engagement, or “SROE,” provide an example of how rules
of engagement reflect LOAC, but also operational and policy constraints.
124 For example, successive commanders of NATO’s International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan have issued a “tactical directive” which limited
where and under what circumstances coalition militaries may use force. The
version General Stan McChrystal issued is notable for its limitations on the use of
airstrikes. Memorandum from the Headquarters of the NATO Int’l Security
Assistance Force (July 6, 2009), available at http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu
/official_texts/Tactical_Directive_090706.pdf. See also Curry, supra note 121
(recalling how colonial armies would purposely delay opening fire in an effort to
maximize British casualties during the American Revolution); HEADQUARTERS
DEP’T OF THE ARMY, supra note 121, at 5–12 (discussing the need and reasons for
restraint in counterinsurgency operations).
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however broadly they may be applied in the spectrum of conflicts,
these considerations do not justify transforming policy constraints
into a general legal obligation. The ability to deliberately attack
enemy belligerents with the full force of combat power available
for mission accomplishment—an authority that implicitly allows
the use of deadly force as a measure of first resort—is an essential
aspect of armed hostilities between organized belligerent groups.
Indeed, the ability to mass the effects of combat power at the
decisive place and time often contributes to accelerating enemy
capitulation, thereby sparing many enemy belligerents who might
otherwise be subject to a loss of life even if a minimum necessary
force obligation were applied.
Admittedly, the complexity borne of government forces
operating in a NIAC—where the need to use deadly force as
opposed to minimum force is unclear and will vary from person to
person—cannot be eliminated. But this dilemma is not newly
discovered. Indeed, as this Article has acknowledged, there are
circumstances when a minimal force requirement may be
appropriate, as in the case of the civilian who directly participates
in hostilities. Again, such targeting is based on conduct and not a
presumption of offensiveness stemming from membership status
in a belligerent armed group. While there may be a legal and
policy basis for requiring government forces to employ the
minimum necessary force in certain circumstances in an NIAC, to
extend a minimum force requirement to include members of
belligerent armed groups is both logically and operationally
inconsistent, dilutes the concept and protections of a civilian, and
further encourages non-compliance with the LOAC.
5.

MAINTAINING DISTINCTION INTEGRITY IN THE
APPLICATION OF THE CCF TEST

There is a rational way to reconcile Section IX with status based
targeting presumptions:
maintain the distinction integrity.
Acknowledging that NIAC involves armed hostilities between
competing belligerent groups is a critical first step in doing so, and
the DPH Study makes an important contribution.125 However, this
must be accompanied by an additional acknowledgment: all
125 See Melzer, supra note 2, at 27–28 (“[C]ivilians, armed forces, and
organized armed groups of the parties to the conflict are mutually exclusive
categories also in non-international armed conflict.”).
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belligerent operatives—those involved in IAC and NIAC—are
subject to status based targeting authority. This acknowledgment
must then lead to the critical conclusion that Section IX cannot
properly be applied to any belligerent, including those identified
by their CCF in a NIAC.
Recognizing a bright line between genuine civilians—even
those who deviate from their presumptive inoffensiveness by
taking a direct part in hostilities—and belligerents will effectively
preserve the critical distinction between conduct and status based
targeting. Only belligerents will be subjected to status based
targeting. This is a necessary aspect of armed conflict, because
broad targeting authority is premised on the conclusion that the
object of attack is not acting as an individual agent, but instead
executing the will of belligerent leadership. It is obvious that this
presumption is at times overbroad. It is a necessary (and at times
unfortunate) aspect of armed conflict that enemy belligerents may
be killed when capture may have been a viable alternative, or even
when they present no actual risk to the attacking force. This is a
consequence of status based targeting authority derived from the
presumption of threat triggered by the status determination. That
authority terminates only when the enemy belligerent is effectively
separated from this subordinate agent derived presumption
through incapacity or surrender.126
This status based targeting authority is triggered by the
determination that an individual is a member of an opposition
belligerent group. It is generally assumed that this determination
will be relatively uncomplicated in the IAC context due to the
expectation that enemy belligerents will wear distinctive uniforms.
However, even during IAC this is not always true. One need only
consider the Taliban armed forces whose appearance was generally
indistinguishable from the civilian population, or unconventional
forces in Iraq who discarded their uniforms in order to appear to
be civilians, as examples of this reality.127 However, NIAC will
almost always involve hostilities with at least one party to the
126 COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 482
(remarking that “no person hors de combat” may be deliberately attacked, which
derives from the “principle of the law of war that those who do not participate in
the hostilities [should] not be attacked”).
127 See
Life in Afghanistan: Taliban Soldiers, GUARDIANUNLIMITED,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/pictures/image/0,8543,-10304255641,00.html (last
visited Nov. 19, 2011) (displaying an image of Taliban soldiers in civilian
clothing).
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conflict that is unlikely to don distinctive uniforms as an
asymmetrical tactic to capitalize on opposition concerns over
targeting civilians in error or because of the absence of any legal
incentive to distinguish themselves from the population. As a
result, conduct will increasingly become the key threat/status
identification criterion. This much is acknowledged by the DPH
Study’s discussion of CCF in the NIAC context.128
Properly understood, CCF in NIAC is therefore neither
synonymous with DPH, nor a means of determining when a
civilian is engaged in DPH. Instead, CCF is a method for
determining belligerent status, with all the consequences that flow
therefrom. Whether CCF produces the same outcome in IAC is
unclear from the Study. CCF unquestionably results in a loss of
protection from an attack. However, because IAC involves
hostilities between lawful combatants—who must satisfy legally
defined qualification requirements to obtain that status129—CCF
does not result in lawful belligerent status.130 Furthermore,
because the concept of an unprivileged belligerent in the context of
IAC is generally rejected (although not universally), individuals
engaging in a CCF in IAC must, by default, remain in the category
of civilian, albeit with a loss of protection from attack and lack of
combatant immunity.131
Applying a proportionality constraint to protect these
individuals is therefore fundamentally different than applying it to
their NIAC counterparts. This is because in the IAC context, CCF
is not a status determination equation, but instead a conduct based
criterion leading to the loss of protection from attack.132
Nonetheless, the individual who loses that protection, while
128 See Melzer, supra note 2, at 33–36 (positing that membership to an armed
group “must depend on whether the continuous function assumed by an
individual corresponds to that collectively exercised by the group as a whole”).
129 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
supra note 14, art. 4 (defining the various categories of persons who can be
deemed Prisoners of War).
130 CCF does not require that an individual satisfy the four requirements in
the 3rd Geneva Convention, but merely requires that they be involved in a
belligerent group on more than just a “spontaneous, sporadic or unorganized
basis.” Melzer, supra note 2, at 35.
131 See Melzer, supra note 2, at 39 (“Where such personnel directly participate
in hostilities without the express or tacit authorization of the state party to the
conflict, they remain civilians and lose their protection against direct attack for
such time as their direct participation lasts.”).
132 Id.
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subject to attack, remains in the category of civilian. Because of
this, it is not illogical to assert that any response to such a threat
must be qualified by a minimum necessary force limitation. This is
because, as civilians, these individuals are not subject to status
based targeting, but continue to benefit from the use of force
limitations inherent in conduct based targeting authority.133 First,
use of force is justified only when the individual’s conduct is
sufficient to rebut the presumption of inoffensiveness; the apparent
purpose of the CCF test.134 Second, the sole purpose of a
responsive use of force is to restore the civilian to a condition of
inoffensiveness, and not to permanently disable the individual’s
ability to execute the will of enemy belligerent leadership, or to
influence the future conduct of the enemy belligerent leadership.135
Accordingly, if measures short of deadly force can effectively
achieve that limited purpose, resorting to deadly force as a
measure of first resort would exceed the conduct based authority
triggered by the DPH.136
5.1. Organized Belligerents: Agents of Leadership Will
Armed conflict, by its very nature, is a contest between armed
groups. Accordingly, the efficacy of the law that regulates armed
conflict is contingent on the recognition of this reality. Treating
non-state operatives as a conglomeration of civilians taking a direct
part in hostilities might, in the abstract, seem like an appealing
response to addressing legal authorities related to such conflicts,
but it fails to account for the collective/corporate nature of armed
conflict. The defining distinguishing factor between a true civilian
and a member of a belligerent group is subordination to the will of
133 See Protocol I, supra note 1, art. 51(3) (“Civilians shall enjoy the protection
afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in
hostilities.”); COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 618
(“The immunity afforded individual civilians is subject to . . . their abstaining
from all hostile acts.”).
134 See COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 618
(“Thus a civilian who takes part in armed combat . . . thereby becomes a
legitimate target, though only for as long as he takes part in hostilities.”); Melzer,
supra note 2, at 33 (defining the criterion for the “continuous combat function”
test).
135 This is evidenced through the limited scope of authority granted in Article
51. See COMMENTARY ON 1977 ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 13, at 615–28.
136 See Melzer, supra note 2, at 82 (discussing how it is against “basic notions
of humanity to kill an adversary . . . where there manifestly is no necessity for the
use of lethal force”).
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belligerent leadership. Whether the result of voluntary choice, or
obligatory service, belligerent operatives do not act as autonomous
agents in armed conflict. Instead, they execute the will of
belligerent leadership.
As noted above, the traditional LOAC targeting framework
acknowledges this reality by permitting presumptive based uses of
deadly force. Once an individual is identified as a member of an
enemy belligerent group, friendly forces are entitled to presume
the individual represents a hostile threat. However, perhaps even
more importantly, friendly forces act in order to disable the ability
of the enemy belligerent operative from executing the will of
enemy leadership. In so doing, not only is the belligerent threat
eliminated, but the corporate capacity of the enemy is degraded.
It has become too simple to assume that the direct participation
in the hostilities equation proposed by the ICRC Study is an
adequate substitute for this traditional targeting authority. That
equation, while certainly an important component in addressing
the threat posed by true civilians who engage in a continuous
combat function, does not provide as coextensive a targeting
authority as the belligerent status based targeting equation. First,
it is based on a requirement to assess each targeting decision
through the lens of an individualized actual threat.137 While the
CCF concept may expand the range of conduct that qualifies as
such a threat, it is nonetheless a conduct based targeting equation.
This fails to account for the need for presumptive based targeting.
Second, its almost unitary focus on individualized threat
assessment fails to account for the legitimate use of attacking
belligerent operatives in order to influence belligerent leadership,
not merely to eliminate an individual threat.138
Applying status based targeting authority to NIAC eliminates
these flaws.
That targeting authority is derived from the
determination that individuals qualify as members of opposition
belligerent groups. This determination is unquestionably complex.
Furthermore, in the NIAC context it will often be based on an
assessment of conduct, for the simple reason that more objective
criteria—like uniforms or specialized military equipment—will be
unavailable. However, even when status threat recognition is
based on similar, if not identical, factors as those at the core of the
137 See id. at 43 (noting the necessity of pointing to “specific acts” when
establishing “direct participation”).
138 See id. (focusing solely on individual participation in hostilities).
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CCF test, the sum of the analysis is not a determination of conduct
based targeting authority. In short, conduct may be the test for
status, but conduct derived status does not trigger conduct based
targeting authority.
Why, if the equation used for CCF and status determinations is
analogous, is this distinction even necessary? This is a logical
question, but one that reveals a disconnect between legal theory
and operational reality. Treating non-state belligerent operatives
as civilians who lose protection from attack for such time, as they
take a direct part in hostilities, even under the expanded CCF test,
grants them an unjustified windfall. This is because it inverts the
traditional targeting presumptions associated with armed conflict.
This approach places the burden of validating individualized
actual threat on the opposing belligerent operative. This burden
allocation is justified when the friendly operative encounters a
civilian with no subordinate relationship to enemy belligerent
leadership. However, it is unjustified when encountering enemy
belligerent operatives. As noted above, imposing validation of
actual threat as the condition precedent to targeting members of
enemy belligerent groups degrades combat initiative, produces
dangerous hesitation, and ultimately provides greater protection
for the non-state operative than for the lawful belligerent. Indeed,
this latter consequence seems especially oxymoronic. Why should
a fighter without the privilege of operating on behalf of a state
benefit from greater protection than his legitimate counterpart?
The only plausible answer to this question is that such an
outcome is a necessary consequence of the inherent uncertainty as
to who is a civilian and who is a non-state belligerent operative.
Applying a unitary conduct based targeting equation to all nonregular armed forces mitigates the risk of erroneous targeting
resulting from this uncertainty. Accordingly, any additional
protection afforded by the non-state actor is an incidental outcome
of a rule intended to maximize protection for true civilians. The
more rational response to this uncertainty—at least from an
operational perspective—is to develop credible and effective status
recognition criteria.
Ultimately, if conduct based status
determinations are based on criteria relatively analogous to the
CCF test, it should be equally effective in mitigating the risk of
targeting errors. However, once that status is established, it would
trigger targeting authority traditionally relied upon to bring enemy
armed forces into submission as efficiently as possible. It will also
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protect friendly forces from the risk associated with treating enemy
operatives as presumptive civilians.
6.

CONCLUSION

The concept of Continuous Combat Function in the ICRCs
Direct Participation in Hostilities Study represents an important
step in clarifying when civilians lose their protection from
deliberate attack. However, this test was not, and should not be
considered the controlling methodology for determining when
non-state belligerent operatives may be lawfully attacked. Instead,
that determination must be made based on a determination of
belligerent status; a determination that triggers a broader targeting
authority than CCF and properly allocates risk between competing
belligerent forces.
Unfortunately, it is increasingly common to assert that nonstate belligerents are merely civilians directly participating in
hostilities. CCF is then relied upon as a logical solution to target
legality decisions when engaged in hostilities against non-state
groups. This is a dangerous trend. CCF is linked to the direct
participation in hostilities qualifier to LOAC civilian protection
from deliberate attack. Because of this, it—like the protection it
qualifies—is not a method for determining enemy belligerent
targetability. Instead, it must be confined to assessing when a true
civilian, an individual acting autonomously and not executing the
will of belligerent leadership, loses protection from attack.
If CCF is confined to this context, it is a logical step forward in
the LOAC. While not a perfect solution to the challenge of dealing
with civilians who engage in conduct inconsistent with their LOAC
derived protections, it at least acknowledges the reality that such
conduct is not restricted to raising a rifle and pulling the trigger.
Even the Section IX concept—that armed forces may use only
minimum necessary force when encountering a civilian who has
engaged in CCF and therefore must detain when feasible—is
acceptable if limited to the autonomous civilian actor. But if
extended to define when members of non-state belligerent groups
may be attacked, the rule loses credibility.
Conflicts between organized non-state groups and State armed
forces are unlikely to abate in the foreseeable future. Indeed, what
is far more likely is that the definition of non-international armed
conflict, and the security challenges to the State that compel policymakers to invoke LOAC authority in response to non-state threats,
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will continue to become more complex. Ultimately, however,
armed conflict must be conceived as a contest between organized
groups. Deviating from this conception undermines the entire
authority/obligation framework of the law.
The direct
participation in hostilities cannot be a substitute for the reality that
armed conflict is a contest between organizations, not a contest
between one organization and a conglomerate of like-minded
autonomous actors. Armed conflicts—even against the most
evasive and loosely organized enemy—are therefore not a one
sided combatant COIN.
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